Time passes so quickly and many occupations may increase exponentially. But hey, it is necessary, cons bad situation! The events in the DRC is still rich. We're sure we're catching up to For Some. The sound of vultures should be interpreted when it is announced. For a while they still ruminating the next step. I wondered who was going to report the first orientation. Those that ICG did not pray. An item to contextualize his latest discovery: the sword in the water of the UN report which I mentioned last time in October on this blog. The outcome has been a flop as regards the battle waged against the Tutsi vultures in the region, and prepare to pass another election victory for Kabila in the DRC, while allocating a modus operandi with the Chinese to undercut the region. A failure so this UN report. Néamoins it remains a no vultures in their effort to isolate Paul Kagame, on behalf of revisionists and other critics. I think the spell for the vultures that Kagame has Kabila was an obstacle on their design. Just a guess.
The sword in the water was a flop, they returned to the charge. The extract below, completely out of the ICG paper reports the November 16 new tactic. I warn that it is also an attempt to isolate Rwanda. And it's a shame how Rwanda has played badly in the hands of the vultures to undermine the struggle of the Congolese Tutsi. In fact, I keep repeating it knowingly, it is a mistake on the part of Rwanda have to try to break the momentum of Laurent Nkunda. This has served only a few greedy interests by delaying the painfully political solution of the problems Kivu in the DRC. CNDP force lies in its cause has not étéannihilée as James Kabarebe had calculated. As against the claim of a Rwandan military presence operations umoja wetu is more than history. And political and military problems remain throughout the world as Congolese generals have witnessed in recent weeks. They came to the situation and prepare for the deployment of CNDP troops out of Kivu. They found that this remains an impossibility. And
ICG produces and displays his new magic solutions, taking care to emphasize the fact that the rapprochement and Kigs Kin is a chimera, then, Kagame, the sponsor of this approximation is pronounced in the useless questions Congolese. But most of the vultures, he knows that if he can be out of the process, the CNDP can not be ruled out. He also knows that only the CNDP can contribute to a restoration of order in Kivu including the solution from the FDLR. Shame that his staff has been so short a view of long-term maturities.
Now I extract delays ICG my considerations. Without further ado read the recommendations quite vautouresques:
Congo: No stability in Kivu despite the rapprochement with Rwanda
Report Africa N ° 165 November 16, 2010 SYNTHESIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
plan to resolve the conflict in Kivu consisting preferred a military solution is proving to be a failure. Two years after the beginning of reconciliation between the Congolese President Joseph Kabila and his Rwandan counterpart Paul Kagame, government soldiers are still battling militiamen for control of land and mining areas. Although neither side has actually the capacity to take a final ascendancy, they both have the resources to continue the fight. Meanwhile, civilians are subjected to extreme violence and the situation Humanitarian deteriorates. Ethnic tensions have worsened in announced plans to repatriate tens of thousands of Congolese refugees who fled Rwanda during the 1990s. The Security Council United Nations observed the deteriorating situation in eastern Congo while not objecting to decisions of Kagame and Kabila.
A strategy based on secret presidential commitments will not bring peace in Kivu: the current approach should be reassessed and expanded to involve all local communities and prepare for the future of the region by establishing a transparent dialogue , particularly with neighboring countries.
During the summer of 2008, the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), a Congolese rebel group, now led by Tutsi General Laurent Nkunda and informally supported by Rwanda withdraws from a negotiation process initiated with the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This new crisis erupts in the province of North Kivu destabilizes the Congolese authorities and the mission of peacekeeping United Nations (then called MONUC). The international community, concerned about the consequences of a conquest of Goma, the capital of North Kivu, the CNDP, increase efforts to prevent an escalation of violence that could lead to a confrontation between Rwanda and DRC.
In November 2008, to end the political and security crisis, President Kabila is reaching out to its traditional adversary, the Rwandan president Paul Kagame. Without recourse to formal mediation mechanisms favored by the international community, the two leaders soon negotiated an agreement whose contents remain secret. The Congolese initiative surprises most international partners of the Great Lakes region. They are relieved however when discussions on a multinational to stabilize the Kivu take an abrupt end.
Under their plan to resolve the conflict in Kivu, Kabila and Kagame are now working on the implementation of bilateral commitments. This involves two con ¬ ¬ sions such major for Kabila. First, he pledged to meet the political demands of the rebel group (CNDP), which caused him more problems with his electoral base in the past. Second, he agreed to launch military operations that serve more the interests of those who lead them n'appor ¬ tent of real protection to the population. The success of this plan, including its political and economic, depends on the reaction of the population of Kivu vis-à-vis the redistribution of power at the local level and capacity of the Congolese national army (FARDC) to achieve the objectives military set by Kinshasa.
conditions of the merger between the DRC and Rwanda have altered the balance of power in the provinces of North and South Kivu. General Nkunda was arrested in January 2009 and replaced by Bosco, an alleged war criminal, against whom the ICC issued an arrest warrant in 2006. CNDP, originally founded to defend the interests of the Tutsi community, is integrated into the national army and became an important component. Its specification is the political center of an agreement between the Congolese government and armed groups in Kivu. The new influence gained by CNDP worries the leaders of other communities who fear that it serves the general elections planned for 2011-2012.
The limitations of the politico-military situation is reached. Despite three successive operations carried out by the Congolese army, the humanitarian situation is deteriorating in Kivu and acts of extreme violence grows. Women and girls, suffer the consequences of impunity and the environment highly militarized ¬ ment in which the practice of rape is endemic. The population is both victim campaigns reprisals by the rebels and unpunished human rights violations committed by Congolese soldiers.
Rwandan Hutu rebel group, the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), resist disarmament campaigns forced into alliances with Congolese militias who refuse to be integrated into the national army. The FDLR have been driven many mine sites they had control, however they have still not been placed under the control of a legitimate authority. Dissidents Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian actively seeking support in Kivu and try to build coalitions armed border. In return, signs of regional interference in the affairs of Kivu multiply.
The rapid integration of former rebels, including some alleged war criminals in the national army and their participation in military operations poorly planned, have not helped to resolve Conflict in eastern Congo. Efforts by the United Nations through the implementation of a new policy of conditionality to support the peacekeepers did not influence the behavior of Congolese troops. The credibility of MONUC - MONUSCO renamed in July 2010 - has been seriously undermined by its inability to effectively protect civilians.
Meanwhile, the struggles for power at the local level have further compromised the restoration of the rule of law in the Kivu provinces. Land conflicts and inter-communal tensions have increased, exacerbated by cycles repeated displacement. Contradictions still exist between customary law and modern law and thus, traditional leaders are opposed to administrative authorities seeking to implement the program of the CNDP. The provincial political institutions tear amid accusations of corruption, resulting crisis of local governance. Despite the increased trade in major border cities and the revitalization of regional economic institutions, economic development long term remains uncertain.
Combined, these factors increase the risk of disintegration the national army, communal clashes and regional destabilization interfer ¬ ence by foreign players. If the current approach is not revised and expanded to include all communities in a transparent manner and whether a new international momentum is not blown, the population will continue to bear the brunt of failed attempts to establish State sovereignty in Kivu. RECOMMENDATIONS
the Congolese government, the MONUSCO and international partners to the DRC:
1. Suspend offensive military operations in Kivu pending the deployment of battalions trained by the United States, China, Belgium, South Africa and Angola, and:
a) deploy battalions Congo, initially, in the Masisi and Rutshuru North Kivu to ensure the safety of the population, while the agreement of 23 March 2009 between the Congolese government and Congolese armed groups is fully implemented, and exert military pressure on the FDLR in North and South Kivu through monitoring and support of these battalions by international partners;
b) immediately focus military resources on MONUSCO protection of populations, including the maintenance airborne capabilities and support rapid deployment teams and joint protection; help the national army to control the territories abandoned by the FDLR, and regain the confidence of the Congolese people by ensuring that rules of engagement are actively implemented and continuing efforts to stop Bosco;
and c) launch a redesigned integration, combined with a new program of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) under international supervision in order to treat If all the soldiers who joined the national army at some point since January 2008, whose former CNDP and Congolese rebels now associated with the FDLR, and begin to reduce troops in Kivu present 60 000-21 000 soldiers for con ¬ ¬ dance with the government plan to reform the army in January 2010.
the Congolese Government and the CNDP:
2. Implement the Agreement of 23 March, including:
a) renewing the mandate of the National Security (CNS), which expired in May 2010 so that international partners can support and monitor the activities of the NSC by making report regularly on the implementation of commitments made by each party , And resume discussions on the recognition of grades of officers of other armed groups that have integrated FARDC
b) naming personalities CNDP in North Kivu provincial institutions in exchange for the effective dismantling of parallel administrative structures and tax CNDP under the supervision of MONUSCO who will report to the NSC, and arresting Bosco.
c) entrusting the national army battalions trained by foreign partners and MONUSCO, responsibility for security in the territories of Masisi and Rutshuru
d) engaging the troops who participated in the opera ¬ tion "Amani Leo" to join the new pro ¬ DDR me, so that all ex-combatants CNDP are fully integrated into the national army or police, or reintegrated into civilian life and
e) Pledging not to get involved in political and military activities of dissidents abroad, including those of Rwandan general Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa. To Governments
Congolese, Rwandans and Ugandans and the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR):
3. Supervise and ensure a stable environment for returning refugees in Kivu, in particular:
a) proceeding, in partnership with UNHCR, a survey of undocumented refugees who returned in Kivu since the summer of 2009, by initiating a process of verification of their nationality and distributing, on this basis, ¬ tors electrical cards before elections, and restarting the joint verification mechanism DRC-Rwanda-Uganda to stem illegal immigration in the Kivu provinces, and
b) commencing on the repatriation of refugees from Rwanda and Uganda under the terms of the UNHCR, there including with regard to voluntary return and security of areas of return; the permanent conciliation committees should decide based on clear criteria, if security conditions are met to allow these returns; areas considered by the MONUSCO as being under control of a parallel administration should not be part of the potential areas of return. The Congolese Government
:
4. Strengthen the capacity of institutions to promote inter-communal reconciliation and dispute management, including:
a) developing skills to manage land disputes, including the creation of a commission responsible for reviewing land title; strengthening Starec - the Congolese government organization supported stabilization programs - to become a permanent mechanism for conflict resolution in implementing the resolutions on peace and security of the Goma conference of 2008 by devoting adequate resources and enlisting staff further through a transparent recruitment process;
b) strengthening the powers of provincial institutions by giving them the resources and authority necessary to meet local needs and creating a legal and administrative framework that allows to treat issues of political representation of ethnic minorities and inconsistencies between customary rights and modern, and
c) regulating the holding of a roundtable discussion with local communities, provincial authorities and national leaders to set clear rules on the allocation of positions within the administration Provincial and in establishing a consensus process to remove local communities armed groups and adopting a code of conduct relating to the exercise of political activities in Kivu. To the Presidents
Congolese, Rwandans, Ugandans and Burundians:
5. Organize a special summit of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes (CEPGL) for:
a) Initiate, in President of the African Development Bank (ADB), political discussions at Heads of States on economic issues, land and population movements, and what the aim of creating a mutually beneficial vision for the Future of the Great Lakes
b) Work together to analyze all the traumatic history of the region in order to promote reconciliation among the Congolese and Rwandans, and
c) Make a commitment not to interfere in legitimate efforts to consolidate the state in eastern Congo.
Nairobi / Brussels, 16 November 2010
